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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FLORENCE J. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8169

LAMAR ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except in unimportant details, the respondent agrees
fully with appellant's statement of facts down to the bottom
of page two of his brief. Thereafter, respondent disagrees
with the argumentative matter comprising the first paragraph on page three of appellant's brief and also the last
full sentence on page four of his brief, beginning "That the
wife * * *." One additional point of disagreement as
to the facts will be mentioned later. Others are not considered important.
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It is felt, however, that the generally accurate statement of the facts given in appellant's brief should be supplemented here in order that the Court might have a more
complete picture in proper perspective.
The parties hereto were divorced by a decree entered
on September 26, 1949. An August 26, 1952, judgment
against the appellant and for the plaintiff-respondent was
given for $4,484.41 unpaid support-money, plus fees and
costs, and the appellant was adjudged in contempt. Sentence for contempt was suspended on condition of payment
of certain installments by appellant. On February 10, 1953,
appellant's commitment to jail was ordered because of his
default in making payments. On May 4, 1953, the appellant, having failed to appeal in the meantime, filed a petition to vacate the orders of August 26th and February lOth
under U. R. C. P. 60 (b) (5, 7). The court below dismissed
the petition to vacate on February 23, 1954, and appellant
appeals this dismissal.
As stated in appellant's brief, the stipulation and agreement providing for the division of property between the
parties hereto, which was made a part of the divorce decree,
provided that half the proceeds from the sale of certain
property in Arizona should go to the wife in lieu of alimony.
The other half of the proceeds of such sale was to be the
property of the husband. It was to be placed in trust and
paid to the wife at the rate of $250.00 per month, in satisfaction of the husband's obligation to support his children,
until it was exhausted; whereupon the husband was to continue support for the children from his other property or
income but at the lesser rate of $200.00 per month. Either
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party could sell the property, and it was to be sold forthwith. No express provision in the agreement or divorce
decree considered the possibility that the property could
not be sold.
A hearing was had on August 22, 1952, upon an order
to show cause why the wife should not be given judgment
for unpaid support money at the rate of $200.00 per month
from the date of the decree. The wife's efforts to sell the
property had been unsuccessful. The husband testified that
he had gone to Arizona several times to sell the property
in question, but that his wife wouldn't cooperate with him
in selling it; and that real estate companies would not list
the property because his wife wouldn't sign papers of some
kind or other (R. 47). When pressed, he admitted that he
had never listed the property with anyone for sale, but he
thought that he had advertised it in the paper (R. 55 line
25 toR. 56 line 4).
On the other hand, the wife testified at the hearing that
the property was listed constantly between the time of the
divorce decree and the time of the hearing with eight or ten
different real estate companies (R. 67), and that she had
advertised the property in the papers almost every week
until she left Arizona and went to Texas (R. 69) to work
(R. 72). Exhibit C was admitted in evidence without objection. It is a letter from an Arizona realtor certifying
that the property in question had been listed with him continuously since September 30, 1949, (four days after the
decree) by the wife, on open listing, and that no reasonable
offer had been received (R. 67). Exhibit C is part of the
record and available for the Court's inspection.
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The husband testified that the wife told him and
her uncle that she had been offered $8500.00 for the property and had refused to take it (R. 48). As to this, the
wife testified that the husband misunderstood her statement; that the husband had told her and Browne, her attorney in the divorce action, that the property was worth
$10,000.00; that she listed it with a company for $10,000.00, but that the company representative, after looking
at the property, said that it was so valueless they hated to
show property of that type; that she had then asked if they
could get $7,000.00 or $8,000.00 for it, and the agent said
he would try; and that she had told the husband of this, thus
the misunderstanding (R. 71). She had never rejected an
offer of $8,000.00 (R. 71). Indeed, the only offer she had
received for the property was one of $1500.00, which was
later withdrawn because zoning regulations or some other
such obstacle made it impossible for the offeror to
tear down the shacks on it and use it for parking (R. 69).
The record does not sustain appellant's statement on page
five of his brief that the wife had been informed by a
realtor that she might get seven or eight thousand. She said
further, as to the value of the property, that she had an
appraisal on it of $2900.00, made six to twelve months prior
to the hearing (R. 71, 72); but that the property would
not be worth this sum at the time of the hearing because
termites had since damaged the buildings, implying that
they had been condemned (R. 72). The oniy reasonable
inference to be drawn from the record is that the $2900.00
appraisal was for sale and not a tax appraisal (R. 71, 72).
That counsel for both parties so treated it is shown clearly
by the record (R. 81).
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The husband also said that he was advised by Browne,
who drew the property agreement and represented the wife
in the divorce action, not to pay support money (R. 49,
64). This testimony does not harmonize with Exhibit A,
admitted in evidence and now in the record on appeal,
being a letter to the wife from Browne (R. 64, 65). Browne
identified Exhibit A as his letter (R. 76).
Under the agreement, any income from the property
prior to sale was to go to the wife. The husband testified
that the property produced from $150 to $180 per month in
rents; that each time he went to Arizona he tried to improve the property by trying to get the pe.ople to paint it;
and that the caretaker of the property was paid from its
income (R. 51, R. 52 lines 1 and 2). The wife said, however, that income from the property had been only enough
to pay for utilities ; that in fact the property was a liability
to her because it was not even self-supporting; and that
taxes were owing on the property itself, as well as on her
home (R. 67, 68).
The agreement had awarded the husband a hotel property which he said he sold for around $4200.00, netting
around $3800.00 after taxes; and he said that he had given
the wife all of that (R. 58). His cross-petition, however,
stated that he had paid $2515.59 to her since the divorce
(R. 21), and a stipulation to this effect was entered at the
hearing (R. 42). He offered no books of account, concelled checks, nor other evidence of the alleged payments
in excess of the stipulated amount.
In addition to the taxes owing on the property and her
home, mentioned above, the wife testified that she had
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recently borrowed $250.00 for current expenses, and that
for the month of the hearing she was in debt for about
$200.00 (R. 69). The record is clear that this $200.00 did ·
not include the taxes. Though the record is not completely
clear on the point, it seems more reasonable to infer that the
$200.00 debt was in addition to the $250.00 borrowed for
current expenses. On cross-examination, she broke the
$200.00 item down into individual debts totalling $195.00
(R. 72).
The wife was earning $265.00 per month at the time
of the hearing, but she had to work for twelve to eighteen
hours a day on two jobs to do that (R. 72, 73). She had
started working for $130.00 per month after the decree
(R. 72).
The court will no doubt be impressed with the fact that
the husband was less than a model of candor as he testified.
It is not difficult to understand, upon reading the record
of his evasive, equivocal, and ambiguous testimony, why
the court below believed the wife rather than him.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT WAS COMMITTED BY THE COURT
BELOW IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S
PETITION TO VACATE.
POINT II.
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S PETITION TO
VACATE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE
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7
REASON THAT IT WAS NOT FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AS REQUIRED BY
RULE 60(b).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT WAS COMMITTED BY THE COURT
BELOW IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S
PETITION TO VACATE.
This appeal is not taken from the orders or judgments
of August 26, 1952 (R. 26, 27), and February 10, 1953 (R.
28, 30), but rather from the order of February 23, 1954 (R.
86), dismissing appellant's petition to vacate those prior
orders. It is significant and important to note that the appellant did not prosecute an appeal from either of the prior
orders sought now to be vacated, nor has the appellant
offered this Court any explanation nor a single excuse for
this failure to appeal. At the time he petitioned the court
below to vacate the prior judgments, his time for taking an
appeal had lapsed for both of them.
The petition to vacate was filed on May 4, 1953, and
hearing thereon was had September 12, 1953. The minute
entry (R. 36) shows that no evidence was taken at the hearing, but that the proceedings consisted only of argument
by counsel, whereupon the matter was taken under advisement. The record does not reveal what points were
raised and argued by counsel. Since no evidence was taken,
however, it is clear that appellant's petition was supported
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solely by the record of the case up to that time, and by
nothing else.
Appellant brought his petition to vacate before the
court under the aegis of 60 (b) (5, 7), U. R. C. P., (R. 34)
which is identical to 60 (b) ( 4, 6) , Federal R. C. P. This
rule provides that a party, on motion, may be relieved by
the court from a final judgment or order, in the furtherance
of justice, if * * * (5) the judgment is void, or * * *
(7) any other reason exists justifying relief from its operation. The motion is required to be made within a reasonable time for the two causes stated.
To justify relief under 60 (b), appellant alleged in his
petition to vacate that (1) the judgments sought to be
vacated were unjust because they were contrary to the
property agreement between the parties, and that (2)
they were void because they were contrary to the terms
of the divorce decree (R. 33). On appeal, however, appellant contends in his brief only that he should have been
given the relief sought because the judgments of August
26 and February 10 were erroneous. In so doing, appellant errs in his tacit assumption that the same grounds
for relief on direct appeal from the challenged judgments
are grounds for relief from those judgments under Rule
60 (b) (5, 7). Respondent denies this basic assumption of
the appellant. Under the facts and circumstances of this
case, the assumption is invalid.
As stated, the sole basis in his brief, for appellant's
allegation of error in the order of February 23, 1954, is his
allegation that the orders of August 26 and February 10
were erroneous. ij:e does not contend in his brief that the
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challenged orders were void. Therefore there is no question
before this Court on appeal concerning the denial below of
relief to appellant under 60 (b) (5), which pertains to void
judgments. It therefore appears that the only question
before the Court at this time is whether or not appellant
should have been given the relief for which he petitioned
under 60 (b) (7)-the "any other reason" clause-because
of the alleged errors committed by the court in issuing the
prior orders of August 26 and February 10. Put another
way, the question is whether or not the single fact that a
prior judgment is erroneous justifies vacating that judgment under 60 (b) (7), under the circumstances of the
present case.
The importance of these circumstances cannot be exaggerated. It must be remembered that appellant failed to
appeal from the challenged orders, that no excuse of any
kind has been offered for this failure, and that his petition to vacate was filed long after the time limits for appealing the challenged orders had lapsed. The respondent's
position is that these circumstances required that appellant be denied the relief sought below, and that they preclude relief from the allegedly erroneous judgments under
60 (b) (7); The matters and issues discussed by appellant
in his brief would have been appropriate and pertinent on
direct appeal from the challenged orders. As will be shown,
they do not justify relief under 60 (b) (7); and this is true
even though it be assumed that the allegations of error in
appellant's brief pertaining to the challenged orders are
all correct. Even if the orders of August 26 and February
10 are assumed to be as erroneous as appellant alleges, in
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other words, this is still insufficient to justify granting
appellant relief under 60 (b) (7). If the court below had
granted the petition to vacate, it would have committed
reversible error in so doing; therefore any incidental error
committed below was harmless to appellant.
Rule 60 (b) (7) is broad enough in its terms to include
anything thought by a court to justify relief from a judgment, and the question here arises as to what limitations
the rule is subject, if any. The respondent's position is, and
the cases hold, that the rule is limited to exclude relief to
appellant under the present circumstances. Relief under
60 (b) is intended to be in the nature of equitable relief
in order to subserve the ends of plain justice under certain
circumstances. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., ... Utah ... ,
260 P. 2d 741, 742, 743. It is not intended to be a circuitous
route by which the time limitation for taking appeals may
be avoided. Relief thereunder may not be had for errors
correctible on appeal when there is no sufficient excuse for
failing to appeal, which is the exact situation here.
As stated above, 60 (b) (7), U. R. C. P., is the same as
60 (b) ( 6) , Federal R. C. P. The rule has been construed
in a number of federal cases, chief among which is Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 95 L. Ed. 207, 71
S. Ct. 209, (1950) which involved the interpretation and
effect of federal rule 60 (b) ( 6) . In that case, the plaintiff
moved the District Court to vacate a judgment which denaturalized him. The motion was denied there and in the
Court of Appeals, and certiorari was obtained. The Supreme Court affirmed. The plaintiff had failed to appeal
the judgment sought to be vacated, and the question before
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the Court was whether or not the plaintiff alleged circumstances showing that his failure to appeal was justifiable.
The circumstances alleged were that ( 1) the challenged
judgment was erroneous as shown by reversal of a companion case on appeal; (2) plaintiff did not appeal because
he was advised by his attorney that he would have to sell
his home to pay the costs thereof ; and ( 3) the government
officer having plaintiff in custody as an alien advised him
not to appeal. The court said, p. 212 L. Ed.:
"Neither the circumstances of petitioner nor
his excuse for not appealing is so extraordinary as
tobringhimwithin * * * Rule60(b) (6)."
The plaintiff there presented circumstances tending
to excuse his failure to appeal the challenged judgment,
whereas the appellant here offers no excuse at all.
In an opinion by Hand, J., the court in United States

v. Borchers, (1947, C. A. 2d N. Y.) 163 F. 2d 347, 350,
cert. denied 332 U. S. 811, 92 L. Ed. 389, 68 S. Ct. 108,
held that:

"* * * Motions to open and vacate do not
lie as a substitute for a deliberately abandoned
appeal * * * "
Denial of a motion under 60 (b) was affirmed in Gilmore v. Hinman, (1951 C. A. D. C.) 191 F. 2d 652, the court
there saying :
"No other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment appears, and a motion of
this sort cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal."
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Perrin v. Aluminum Co. of America, (1952, C. A.
9th) 197 F. 2d 254, was an appeal from a denial of motions
to vacate under Federal Rule 60 (b) (6). The court affirmed, failing to find that the lower court abused its
discretion in any particular. The court said:

" * * Rule 60 (b) was not intended to be
resorted to as an alternative to review by appeal,
nor as a means of enlarging by indirection the time
for appeal except in compelling circumstances where
justice requires that course * * *. Appellants
had opportunity to obtain appellate review of the
very rulings of which they now complain but failed
to take advantage of the opportunity within the time
prescribed by Rule 73 (a). Having in consequence
of their own lack of diligence been turned away at
the front door they now seek entry at the rear.
Certainly Rule 60 (b) was not designed to afford
machinery whereby an aggrieved party may circumvent the policy evidenced by the rule limiting the
time for appeal * * *"
The rule of these cases was followed in M orse-Starrett
Pr'Oducts Co. v. Steccone, (1953, C. A. 9th) 205 F. 2d 244,
249, affirming denial of a motion under Federal Rule
60 (b) (6).

Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Barrett, (1954, C. A. 5th) 213
F. 2d 776, 779, 780, is the latest federal case in point, involving the same clauses of 60 (b) as were used by appelant here to support his petition to vacate. There, an appeal
was taken from a judgment which dissolved a permanent
injunction and vacated the prior final judgment under
60 (b). The appellate court affirmed dissolution of the injunction under Federal Rule 60 (b) ( 5), which is the same
as our Rule 60 (b) (6), but reversed the order vacating the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
prior judgment under Federal Rule 60 (b) (4, 6). The court
discussed the clause pertaining to void judgments on page
779, and found the challenged judgment to be erroneous
but not void. Then, at page 780, considering the application of Federal Rule 60(b) (6) to an erroneous judgment,
the court said :
"The mere fact that the judgment was erroneous does not constitute 'any other reason justifying
relief' from it. Again, appellees' remedy was to appeal directly from the erroneous judgment and have
it set aside in due course (citing Ackermann case).
Rule 60 (b), supra, was not intended as, and it is not,
a substitute for a direct appeal from an erroneous
judgment. This rule was not designed to 'circumvent the policy evidenced by the rule limiting the
time for appeal' (citing Perrin case) * * * "
The appellant comes before this Court urging nothing
in support of his contention that it was error to deny him
relief under 60 (b) (5, 7) but that the judgments sought to
be vacated are erroneous. He points to no alleged error
which could not have been corrected on appeal, yet he
offers no excuse for his failure to appeal. He therefore
cannot prevail.
POINT II.
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S PETITION TO
VACATE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE
REASON THAT IT WAS NOT FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AS REQUIRED BY
RULE 60(b).
Appellant's petition to vacate was filed more than
seven months after the order of August 26, after compliance
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with that order for several months by the appellant, and
nearly three months after the order of February 10. It
must be remembered that these challenged orders were not
taken in default of appearance by the appellant, but resulted from contested, adversary proceedings. There was
no showing, nor any attempt to show, that conditions at
the time of the petition were not the same as when the
challenged orders issued. Not even the slightest excuse or
justification has been offered by the appellant for the delay
in attacking those orders. No excuse whatsoever has been
offered for the failure to appeal from them, and no equitable
reason is suggested to justify the extraordinary relief
sought under 60 (h) . Society, the parties, and the courts
have too great an interest in the permanence and stability
of final judgments to permit them to be attacked without
excuse or justification after so unreasonable a delay. The
dismissal below of appellant's petition to vacate should be
affirmed for the good and sufficient reason that it was not
filed within a reasonable time as contemplated by Rule
60 (b).
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CONCLUSION
In order to protect the permanence and stability of
final judgments, this Court should affirm the dismissal of
appellant's petition to vacate on the grounds that it was
not filed within the reasonable time required by Rule
60(b).
In order to protect the integrity of our Rule 73 (a),
and to prevent abuse of the desirable procedure established
by Rule 60 (b), this Court should reject the contentions of
appellant that erroneous judgments may be vacated under
60 (b) for that reason alone and despite an unexcused
failure to appeal them. The avenue provided by 60 (b)
should be left open wide for those who desire to enter for
good cause shown, but it should be closed against those who
attempt thereby to circumvent without sufficient cause the
appellate procedure established by our Rules.
The judgment of February 23, 1954, dismissing appellant's petition to vacate should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
WOODRUFF C. GWYNN,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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